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'EACH FOR THEMSELVES' OR 'ONE FOR ALL'? THE 




In the Australian liberal democratic tradition, the expectation that government be 
accountable to the people is a product of the electorate's grant of power to government. 
As government becomes more complex due to the expansion of human activity it 
regulates there is increased reliance upon official means of facilitating democratic 
accountability. Indicative of this development is the 20th century supplementation of 
traditional Westrninster1 mechanisms of accountability with administrative law 
institutions such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman. These supplementary review 
processes and institutions of 'new administrative law' aim to render the application of 
discretionary decision-making by government administrators transparent and fair to 
the individual citizen. This was the primary vision of the Kerr and Bland Committees 
which framed the need for administrative review agencies against the background of 
the protection and promotion of individual citizen rights. 2 
Three decades later and administrative law agencies such as the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman continue to encourage good administration and therefore to act for, and 
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on behalf of, the public3 While this objective of improving public administration has 
remained constant since the Office commenced operations in 1977, a close examination 
of the history of the Commonwealth Ombudsman reveals operational changes. One 
such critical change is that the individual complaint-handling operation of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman has dramatically altered. While current Annual R'1'orts 
of the Commonwealth Ombudsman confirm that the 'primary function of the 
Ombudsman's office is to handle complaints and enquiries from members of the public 
about government administrative action',4 the data used in this article shows that the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman has increased its use of discretion to now refer large 
numbers of individual complainants away from its own complaint-handling services. 
At first blush, such usage of discretion suggest that when evaluated against its original 
objectives of protecting the individual's rights of review of discretionary decision-
making, the Commonwealth Ombudsman is failing the persons for which it was 
established. 
This article argues that administrative review agencies should not remain static 
while the system of government and administration changes. Today the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman has three clear functions - individual complaint-
handling, systemic investigation and audit - reflecting a change in emphasis towards 
what may be broadly termed the quality control of government administration.5 An 
increase in the use of own motion and audit powers to improve the quality and 
efficiency of administrative decision-making need not conflict with the objective of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman to provide an individual citizen with rights to review. 
Administrative law which regulates the relationship between the governors and the 
governed does not just take place in courts, Parliament, Cabinet, tribunals and in 
ombudsmen offices - discretionary decisions applying to individual citizens are made 
primarily by administrators. Indeed, the history of the 'new administrative law' 
includes an acknowledgement that administrative review need not be only reactive 
and critical of processes and discretionary decision-making, but that it can, and should, 
be proactive and constructive, and act to improve decision-making by individual 
government administrators. 
More difficult to evaluate is the impact which promoting improvements to overall 
administrative deCision-making and increasing audit functions will have upon the role 
the Ombudsman plays in protecting individual review rights and therefore upon 




See Hot Holdings v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438, 467 (Kirby J), citing Paul Finn's three forms of 
accountability as follows: 
One fOIm is accountability to official superiors and peers. This is the preferred, but most 
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correcting defective decisions which concern the individual citizen?6 Or is it best to 
increase admiuistrative efficiency and justice through improving the system of overall 
decision-making and thus assuring the public that the rule of law is safeguarded?7 The 
wider issue for the system of administrative review is whether such questions expose 
inherent tension in the aim of promoting good government administration for the 
benefit of the public. While the original 1970s architects of the 'new administrative law' 
were cognizant of such issuess the question as to whether improvements would flow 
on to the wider system of administrative review, and the related ramifications for 
efficiency of the administrative process, were viewed as peripheral to the objective of 
safeguarding the individual. 
In conclusion, this article recommends ongoing reflection and evaluation of the 
changing emphasis of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The future challenge is the 
practical difficulty of how an accountability institution such as the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman may preserve equilibrium between the goals of protecting individual 
rights and improving the overall quality of the administrative system9 It is suggested 
that it is critical that the Office retain its current primary focus upon the individual 
complainant. To travel too far down the path of quality improvement may mean that 
the Office will fail, or be perceived to fail, to protect the individual complainant and 
thus remove an important avenue for individual citizens to hold government 
democratically accountable. 
THE COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
CITIZEN 
The architects of the 'new administrative law' focused upon providing redress to the 
individual citizen. The mould for the approach of the committees was the common law 
conception of administrative review, with discussion confined largely to the 
institutions which should supplement courts in their role of reviewing administrative 
decisions affecting individuals. Three committees considered the introduction of the 
'new admiuistrative law': The Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee ('the 
Kerr Committee') which in October 1971 recommended a new system of administrative 
law;10 the second committee, the Committee on Administrative Discretions ('the Bland 
Committee') issued two separate reports in January 1973 and in October 1973;11 and 
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Ellicott Cornmittee,)12 The result of the deliberations of the Committees was the 
Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) together with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 
(Cth), and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (,ADJR Act') 
which set up the framework for the federal system of administrative law. On 
introducing the Bill for the ADJR Act, the Attorney-General, Mr Ellicott QC stated: 
It will thus be seen that the 3 avenues of reviewr appeal on the merits to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal [lithe AAT'], investigation by the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, and judicial review by the Federal Court of Australia, provide different 
approaches to the remedying of grievances about Commonwealth administrative action. 
Each has its own place in a comprehensive scheme for the redress of grievances.13 
The central focus of the institutions created through the reform was to address the 
individual grievances of citizens. This is not surprising given that the terms of 
reference14 of each of the Committees focused upon the redress of individual 
grievances. Any impact that such redress of individual grievances may have upon 
improving the overall system of administrative review was seen as incidental to the 
process of reform.15 
Of course, today, exclusive focus upon the correction of poor government decision-
making in individual cases is no longer the sole objective associated with the 
administrative review system. By the mid 1990s the Administrative Review Council 
observed four objectives of the merits review system: improving the quality and 
consistency of agency decision-malcing, providing the correct and preferable decision 
in individual cases, providing an accessible mechanism for merits review, and 
enhancing the openness and accountability of government.16 The current view is that 
the correction of individual wrongs is not the only path for administrative review to 
achieve balance between administrative efficiency and individual justice. 
EACH FOR THEMSELVES: THE TRADITIONAL CORE ROLE OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN 
The establishment of the Commonwealth Ombudsman thereby occurs within a legal 
framework where democratic accountability equates to individual rights. This 
individual rights approach fits ideologically with the 1970s and 1980s, decades where 
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No 56 (1973) (Ellicott Committee Report). 
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and Hayne JJ). 
Although there was some comment that acknowledged that it may have broader 
application, see for example the terms of reference of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth 
Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [1]. 
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Ithe desirability of achieving justice to the individual and the preservation of the efficiency 
of the administrative process!: ibid [12]. 
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The first federal parliamentary records, which commence in 1963, evidence the 
overwhelming focus upon the role of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in providing 
redress for individual grievances18 In an internal Treasury report provided to the 
Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department in 196719 it was claimed that political 
leaders at a federal level were 'lukewarm or opposed to Ombudsmen' as Parliament 
provides a sufficient access for individual grievances and administrative problems.20 
This focus upon the individual complainant is reflected in the model chosen for the 
Office. The rejected model as proposed by the Kerr Committee was a 'General Counsel 
for Grievances'. The Committee favoured locating the 'grievance man within the 
system of administrative review rather than in the parliament-executive context' 21 
This approach would accommodate a larger role for the Office than that of a traditional 
Ombudsman,22 as apart from the investigation of complaints relating to 
administration by the public service, additional functions envisaged for the office 
included the Ombudsman advising complainants of their rights of review before 
courts or tribunals and extended to proceeding on their behalf in some cases. 23 This 
suggestion was subsequently revised by the Bland Committee, which 'saw a less 
extensive role for the Ombudsman than the Kerr Committee'. 24 'The Bland proposals 
were for an Ombudsman located outside the legal system of administrative review, 
oriented towards resolution of individual complaints and generally better at swatting 
flies than huntinglions.'25 This was the model adopted. The Ombudsman model 
introduced aimed to provide independent investigation and resolution of individual 
grievances with the power to make recommendations to departments and agencies 
rather than a role such as that performed by the Administrative Review Council which 










Archival parliamentary material records confidential files on the concept of the 
Ombudsman from 1961: See Archive file: ECOSOC - Proposal for an "Ombudsmanl1 in 
Australia File No 929/1/4. See also Archive files: No 68/3880; No 929/1/4; see also 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 April 1970, 1 314; 15 
March 1967, 724; 26 April 1966 1 195; 27 April 1965, 921; 13 October 1964 1875; 10 
September 1963 807. 
A Harris, First Assistant Secretary, Ref No BA 66/36 Commonwealth Treasury Canberra 
ACT to The Secretary Prime Ministers Department contained in National Archives. 
Ibid. The other reasons being that the population is too large in relation to Commonwealth 
functions with the special difficulty of vast geographical spread; and difficulties associated 
with the federal system. 
Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [313}. 
For example, the Office was envisaged as an advocate with an incidental system fixing role 
which Iwould act mainly on complaint being made to himl : Ibid [313]. Even so, Chapter 15 
of the report discussing the proposed Ombudsman makes no mention of improvement to 
the system of administrative review. 
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Parliament of 
Australia, Review of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (1991) 8. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1977-78) 2. 
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 23, 14. 
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The Parliamentary Debates of the Ombudsman Bill 1976 also emphasize the redress 
of individual grievances. 26 Statements made during the passage of the Bill include: 
'The Ombudsman Bill is virtually to establish a judicial office to guarantee that 
complaints are investigated';27 that the Office would be 'empowered to investigate 
grievances by members of the public about administrative actions of officials and staff 
of Commonwealth departments, statutory authorities and other government 
agencies'/8 and 
to investigate allegations that are made by individuals against administrative discretion and 
the way in which it has been exercised, to ascertain whether an injustice has been done to the 
individual citizen and, if there is an injustice, to initiate steps that will result in rectifying 
it29 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Ombudsman Act 1976 describes the essential 
features of the Ombudsman as bein!f 'to investigate complaints made to him about 
administrative functions of officials.'3 While the legislation contained powers to allow 
the Ombudsman to investigate matters of his or her own motion and to make 
recommendations for systemic change (not limited to the individual case in question) 
this role was not prioritised by the policy-makers of the day. 
Today, the Commonwealth Ombudsman maintains an ongoing self-proclaimed 
focus upon individual complaints, stating that its 'essential business ... is to handle 
complaints and enquiries from members of the public about government 
administrative action,.cn This traditional individual complainant focus is evidenced in 








• each Annual Report of the Office contains a detailed statistical report of 
individual complaints; 
• since the early 1990s the Office has instigated the long-term collection and 
recording of data through consultants carrying out client satisfaction 
surveys for individual complainants;32 and 
• nearly 500 000 grievances handled with over a 25 year period by the Office 
- a large number when compared to the number of Federal Court 
applications for administrative law matters being less than 10 000 (in the 
same period) and the combined administrative review caseload of the 
The role of the Office was described in parliamentary debate as one 'of investigating, 
conciliating and cajoling' see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 4 June 1975, 3366 (fohn Howard). 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 August 1976, 474 
(Lionel Bowen). 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 4 June 1976, 3068 (Robert 
Ellicott, Attorney-General). 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 August 1976, 476 (Neil 
Brown). 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1977-78) 3. See also Commonwealth, above n 
28. 
Conunonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2007-08) 2. 
See, eg, Roy Morgan Research Centre, Public Awareness Suroey (June 1992); AGB McNair, 
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2010 Changing Emphasis of the Commonwealth Ombudsman 149 
major Commonwealth tribunals since they were established being over 400 
000 decisions.33 
Individual complaint-handling statistics (1977-2005)34 
It is this continual and ongoing focus by the Office upon individual complaint-
handling which renders analysis of its track record a viable and effective option to both 
map historical trends and predict future outcomes for its operations. For this purpose 
the individual complaint-handling data in each Annual Report of the Office from 1977-
2005 is aggregated in Tables 1 and 2. The data is aunually allocated to each of the seven 
individuals who have held the position of Ombudsman between 1977 to the present 
day: 
• Professor Jack Richardson OR) 1977-85; 
• Geoffery Kolts (GK) 1986-87; 
• Professor Dennis Pearce (DP) 1988-91; 
• Alan Cameron (AC) 1991-92; 
• Philippa Smith (PS) 1993-98; 
• Ron McLeod (RM) 1998-2003; 
• Professor John McMillan AO OM) 2003- present. 
To facilitate data analysis the statistics have been divided into two time periods 
which correlate with individual Ombudsman. The first period of 16 years, from 1977-
93, is contained in Table 1. The second period of 12 years, from 1994-2005, is contained 
in Table 2 (discretion rates are noted separately below for 2006, 2007 and 2008 due to 
changes in the work practices of complaint recording by the Office). 
At the outset it should be noted that there are two main categories of complainants 
who find themselves in the 'wrong place' and are thus referred away from the 
Ombudsman: 
1 'Out of jurisdiction' / request for information complainants; and 
2 complainants who are 'referred back' to the agency. 
While the data in this article focuses upon those complainants classified as being 
'within jurisdiction' it is worth briefly noting the Significant number of 'out of 
jurisdiction' or request for information complainants that the Office also receives. For 
example, in 2008-09 of the 45 719 total approaches and complaints received by the 




Robin Creyk€, 'The Performance of Adm:inistrative Law in Protecting Rights! in Tom 
Campbell. Jeffrey Goldswortby and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of 
Rights (2006) 101, 120. 
The detailed data finishes at 2005. On 29 November 2005 the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
issued a tpublic Statement: Changes to OmbudsmanTs Work Practices', which notes that 
lupcoming work practice and systems changes will affect our statistical recording .. .it may 
mean that our complaint statistics for 2005-06 are not representative or comparable with 
those for previous years. I Commonwealth Ombudsman, 'public Statement: Changes to 
Ombudsman's Work Practices l (Press Release, 29 November 2005) 
<-ww-w.ombudsman.gov.auj commonwealthjpublish.nsfjContentjmediarelease_20> at 2 
March 2009. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008-09) 13, 17. 
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out of jurisdiction complaints have not been subject to comprehensive empirical 
investigation36 it is suggested that the need for such work is increasingly critical given 
an emerging trend across Australian ombudsmen as to a growing number of 'out of 
jurisdiction' complaints straining already limited budgetsP In the 2008-09 Annual 
Report of the Commonwealth Ombudsman it was observed that there was a 30 per cent 
increase over the previous year in out of jurisdiction complaints and requests for 
information.38 
It is the second category of complainant, those that are turned away while being 
within jurisdiction, which are the focus of this article. In Table 1 and 2 the total number 
of finalised complaints includes the number of complaints within jurisdiction where 
discretion was used by the Office not to investigate that complaint. This is necessary as 
the legislation administered by the Office prOVides the discretion not to investigate a 
complaint in particular circumstances39 This use of discretion by the Ombudsman 
does not leave a complainant without further avenues to pursue. For example, apart 
from using discretion to refer an individual complainant back to the agency they are 
complaining about, the Office may also use the discretion to transfer complaints to 








In one of the only recent studies, the Northern Territory Ombudsman provided data to 
track out of jurisdiction complaints. In 2008-09 it was determined that within the Northern 
Territory 53 per cent or 818 complaints were out of jurisdiction, the Annual Report notes 
that l[sJtatistics were kept for the first time regarding the inquiries that were out of 
jurisdiction. The results show that 24% were about employment issues and 14% related to 
consumer affairs issues. I Northern Territory Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008-09) 21. 
For example in the 2008-09 Annual Report of the Queensland Ombudsman it was noted that 
I[r]eferrals have increased 136% since 2005-20061 and that '[w]ith the increasing number of 
complaint resolution bodies being established, both in government and in the private 
. sector, people are becoming confused about the correct agency to contact for assistance. I; 
Queensland Ombudsman, Annual R'1'ort (2008-09) 16. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual R'1'ort (2008-09) 13. 
The groWlds upon which the Ombudsman can exercise this discretion are contained in s 6 
of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), eg, the Ombudsman can decline to investigate if a matter 
is more than 12 months old; if the complainant does not have a sufficient interest in the 
subject matter of the complaint; if a complainant has not first raised the complaint with the 
agency; or if there is a more appropriate alternative avenue of review available to the 
complainant. Practically, the most important of these powers is the discretion not to 
investigate Wltil the complainant has raised the complaint at first instance with the agency 
concerned: Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual R'1'ort (2003-04) 14-25 .. 
Such as the Privacy Commissioner; the Public Service Commissioner; an industry 
ombudsman; the Australian Broadcasting Authority; the Australian Communications 
authority and the Employment Services Regulatory Authority: Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) 
s 6. 
Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 6A. 
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Table 1: 
Individual complaints finalised under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) from 
1977-1993 
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1992-1993 AC 14362 4506 31% 
1991-1992 AC 15237 4590 30% 
1990-1991 DP 12721 3968 31% 
1989-1990 DP 9646 2304 24% 
1988-1989 DP 10779 2536 24% 
1987-1988 GK 11180 2631 24% 
1986-1987 GK 10279 2571 25% 
1985-1986 JR 11563 2222 19% 
1984-1985 JR 12864 2011 16% 
1983-1984 JR 10130 1306 13% 
1982-1983 JR 7148 1468 21% 
1981-1982 JR 6483 1285 20% 
1980-1981 JR 6845 1327 19% 
1979-1980 JR 5493 1036 19% 
1978-1979 JR 2146 343 16% 
1977-1978 JR 1030 199 19% 
Totals 147906 34303 23% 
It follows that the actual number of complaints dealt with may be determined 
through subtracting those where the Office used its discretion to refer individuals 
away from the total number of complainants who contacted the office. So, for example 
in Table 1 the number of total finalised complaints is 147 906. When the number of 
complaints where discretion not to investigate was exercised is removed (34 303) we 
are left with a total of 113 603 complaints being investigated from 1977 through to 
1993. This figure is then converted to a percentage in the final column meaning that the 
rate of discretion was 16 per cent in 1978-79 (ie: 16 per cent of complainants were 
turned away in the year the Office began operations) rising to 31 per cent in 1992-93. 
A longitudinal comparison42 of the data in Tables 1 and 2 reveals a startling change 
in Office practice. Over history there is a dramatic increase in the use of the 
42 This article uses standardised statistics and itemises them into portfolio, year and 
individual Ombudsman to allow meaningful analysis and comparisons of the longitudinal 
operation of the Office. For an overview as to the methodology use to create this data: See 
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discretionary powers to decline to deal with a 'within jurisdiction' complainant. To 
take for example Table 2, which identifies the period of 1993-2005 during which 
Philippa Smith, Ron McLeod and the current Ombudsman, Professor John McMillan, 
hold office. Table 2 provides the numbers of finalised complaints dealt with in each 
year under the Ombudsman Act 1976 by the relevant Ombudsman and the numbers of 
those complaints where the Ombudsman used discretion not to investigate - meaning 
that in the year 2004-05 Professor John McMillan used discretion to not investigate 73 
per cent of approaches to the Office. Table 2 shows the discretion percentage not to 
investigate has increased from 46 per cent in 1993-94 to 73 per cent in 2004-05. This 
rate has remained steady. In 2005-06 the discretion rate was 66 per cent43, in 2006-07 it 
was 76 per cent44 and in 2007-08 it was 75 per cent45 and in 2008-09 it was 73 per 
cent.46 When compared with Table 1, this trend is clearly different from that of the first 
four Ombudsmen who held Office between 1977-93. During this sixteen year period a 
total of 23 per cent or 34 303 complainants were subject to the use of discretion. 
The data therefore identifies a tripling in the use of discretion by the Office since 
inception.47 In Table 1 the 16 year period from 1977-93 has an overall percentage of 23 
per cent of complainants or 34 303 people being 'referred away' (this phrase includes 
complaints redirected back to an agency or referred to other complaint bodies) from 
the Office, while in Table 2 the 12 year period between 1993-2005 reveals an overall 
percentage of 65 per cent or 144 685 individuals making a complaint to the Office being 
subject to the exercise of discretion. The result being that this increasing uSe of 







Anita Stuhmcke, 'Changing Relations between Government and Citizen: Administrative 
Law and the Work of the Australian Conunonwealth Ombudsman' (2008) 67(3) The 
Australian Journal o[Public Administration 321-39. 
Commonwealth Ombudsm<m Annual Report (2005-06) 23. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2006-07) 2. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2007-08) 19. As noted above the data for the 
years from 2006 onwards is not included in tabular form due to changes in Office work 
practices. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman- Annual Report (2008-09) 15. 
Removal or aggregation of the data to take into account the four year difference between 
the time periods being compared does not significantly impact upon this finding. 
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Table 2: 
Individual complaints finalised under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) 
from 1993-2005 
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2004-2005 JM 16192 11755 73% 
2003-2004 JM 16297 11881 73% 
2002-2003 RM 18814 13170 70% 
2001-2002 RM 18036 14242 79% 
2000-2001 RM 20967 16657 79% 
1999-2000 RM 19156 15224 79% 
1998-1999 RM 23306 15558 67% 
1997-1998 PS 20341 12750 63% 
1996-1997 PS 21283 11720 55% 
1995-1996 PS 18451 8409 46% 
1994-1995 PS 14281 6651 47% 
1993-1994 PS 14340 6668 46% 
Totals 221464 144685 65% 
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Despite this large increase in the percentage of complainants who are referred away 
from the Office there is little statistical breakdown available in the Annual Reports 
providing reasons why cases within jurisdiction are not pursued. When statistics are 
included even the more. detailed explanations, such as in the 2000-01 Annual Report 
retain a high level of generality, stating for example that in '68 % of instances, the 
complainant was advised to pursue the matter with the agency concerned in the first 
instance. There was clearly no defective administration by the agency and 
investigation was not warranted in another 19% of cases.'48 In each Annual Report since 
2000-01 where statistics are offered to explain why complainants within jurisdiction 
are referred away anywhere between 40-70 per cent49 of the total within jurisdiction 
48 
49 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2000-01) 12. Any additional reasons stated in 
Annual Reports are both general and rare for example, 'A smaller number of complaints 
are not investigated due to insufficient information, or where the client requests that their 
complaint be withdrawn.' Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1997-98) 41. 
See, eg, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2000-01) 12 - 68 per cent; 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2001-02) 16 - 67 per cent: Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, Annual Report (2002-03) 13 - 69 per cent: Commonwealth Ombudsman, 
Annual Report (2003-04) 23 - 43 per cent: Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report 
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complainants are referred back to agencies to raise their, complaint at first instance. It 
may therefore be suggested that failure to complain to an agency at first instance is the 
major reason for referring complainants away from the jurisdiction of the Office. This 
assertion is also supported by statements by Ombudsman such as in the 2008-09 
Annual Report observing that the 'conunon reason for not investigating a complaint is 
that the person has not raised the complaint with the agency involved'. SO Indeed the 
policy of the Office is that it is a complaint agency of 'last resort,S1 meaning that 
complainants should raise their issue of complaint with the agency they are 
complaining about before contacting the Office. 
Is the Conunonwealth Ombudsman failing the persons for whom it was 
established? 
The data raises the issue as to whether this escalation in the use of the discretion rate 
contradicts the traditional and ongoing self-proclaimed focus of the Conunonwealth 
Ombudsman upon the individual complainant. Indeed, concern over this large cohort 
of complainants being referred away by the Office has resulted in the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman implementing measures to improve complaint-handling at the 
departmental level.s2 Importantly, quality in agency complaint-handling skills will 
decrease, the Office workload. The logic being that as agencies improve their 
complaint-handling, complaints about those agencies to the Office should both 
decrease and a complainant should be able to be referred back to that agency at first 
instance to have their matter reviewed. The aim is therefore twofold: reduce overall 
individual complaints through improving agency complaint-handling skills and 
thereby raise the profile of the Office as an agency of last resort. 
In this respect two identifiable steps have been implemented by the Office to 
improve agency complaint-handling. The first is that from 1994 the Office has 
positioned itself as the standard setter for good complaint-handling and thus 
entrenched the notion of good complaint-handling within government agencies. To 
entrench normative change the Office shifts from a single agency approach to looking 
at how it could improve complaint-handling across the entire government sector. This 
was initially done through the provision of presentations and publishing reports and 
guidelines such as: Oral Advice - Some Questions and Issues (1995-96); Issues Relating to 
Oral Advice: Clients Beware (1997); A Good Practice Guide for Effective Complaint Handling 





(2004-05) 20 - 40 per cent; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008-09) 17 - 58 
per cent. 
Commonwealth Ombuds= Annual Report (2008-09) 17. 
Indeed, the reference to the Office as an agent of last resort - pushing complaints back to 
agencies - is used for the first time in the Annual Report (1996-97): Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, Annual Report (1996-97) 3. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2002-03) 14. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Oral Advice: Some Questions and Issues (1996); 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Issue Relating to Oral Advice Clients Beware: Report Under 
Section 35A the Ombudsman Act 1976 (1997); Commonwealth Ombudsman A Good Practice 
Guide for Effective Complaint Handling (1999), Commonwealth Ombudsman, Balancing the 
Risks Own Motion Investigation Into the Role of Agencies in Providing Adequate Information to 
Customers in a Complex Income Support System: Report Under Section 35A of the Ombudsman 
Act 1976 (1999) and To Compensate or not to Compensate Own Motion Investigation of 
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second step is to address the lack of effective government agency internal complaint 
mechanisms with the Office stimulating the creation within agencies of internal 
complaint-handling units. Such units are set up to ensure transparency, responsiveness 
and objectivity within the agency when dealing with complainants. The Office 
supports these steps by being perceived to be, and performing, wider functions across 
the system of administrative review such as becoming a member of the Australian 
Federal Police Commissioner's Education Advisory Council to help develop a culture 
of best practice. External observers validate this process, for example, in 1997 the then 
Prime Minister, John Howard, stated that '[slince its inception the Office has assisted 
the public sector to improve the way it operates.'54 
More recently the need to ensure the Office is not failing complainants it refers 
away has been recognized by the current Ombudsman, Professor John McMillan (from 
2003-08). Professor McMillan has introduced two internal operational developments: 
firstly, standing arrangements with agencies for referrals and secondly, introducing a 
Public Contact Team (,PCT').55 In relation to standing arrangements with agencies the 
Office has created a referral system whereby complaints are referred directly by the 
Office to the agency internal complaint-handling unit thereby eliminating the need for 
the complainant to have to contact and repeat the details of their issue to the agency. 
This arrangement has been employed with some of the larger individual complaint 
generating agencies such as the Australian Taxation Office ('ATO') and Centrelink. The 
supplementary development of the PCT is an attempt to control the guidance and 
advice of Office staff with respect to the complainants referred back to an agency. The 
aim of the PCT Office staff is to make referrals appropriately and to attempt to limit 
review fatigue or 'complaint fatigue'. 56 The complainant is given the contact details for 
an agency's complaint area and advised to contact the Office again if they are not 





Commonwealth Arrangements for Providing Financial Redress for Maladministration: Report 
Under Section 35A of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (1999). See also: Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, Better Practice Guides <http:j /www.ombudsman.gov.au/pages/ 
publications-and-media/better-practice-guides/> at 14 April 2010 and Professor jobn 
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(Speech delivered at the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, National Administrative 
Law Forum, Canberra 3-4 july 2003, <http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/docs/speeches/ 
futuredirections-AIAL-4july03.pdf > at 14 Apri12010). 
jobn Howard, 'Message; 20th Anniversary of the Office of the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman july 1997', Twenty years of the Commonwealth Ombudsman 1977-1997 (1997) 
cited in Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services, Report 
No 42 (1998) [4.71]. 
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Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2004-05) 67-73; as to the introduction of the 
Public Contact Team see the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005-06) 40-45. 
In Professor jobn McMillan's second term (2008-current) an Internal working party has 
recommended further changes to the way that complaints are managed see the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2007-08) 42. 
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on the pursuit of their complaint. See Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005-
06) 40-45. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005-06) 43. 
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Whether the Office is failing the persons for whom it was established is however 
neither proved nor disproved by either the data which shows high discretion rates or 
by identifying such operational changes within the Office. To know whether the Office 
is failing such persons we must know what happens to them when they are referred 
back to agencies to have their complaint dealt with. Some attempt has been made to 
ascertain this by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The 2003-04 Annual Report 
mentions a Client Satisfaction Survey conducted in May 2004 which shows that the 
large majority (87 per cent) of complainants advised to take their complaint directly 
with the agency followed the advice of the OfficeS8 The 2008-09 Annual Report of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman also notes a further client survey on this matter, finding 
that where the Office advised a person to take up their matter with the agency first, 
88% of all complainants did so. The main reasons complainants (12 per cent or 1288 
people) did not take up their complaint was that they did not have the confidence that 
the agency would be helpful, they resolved their problem another way or it was too 
difficult. 59 Such monitoring is therefore important as respondents who give up before 
having their complaint resolved are generally attributed to have done so due to 
suffering from 'complaint fatigue'. 60 
These surveys demonstrate concern by the Commonwealth Ombudsman that 
complainants not be disadvantaged through being referred back to agencies. It remains 
difficult however to thereby conclude that the outcome of such surveys is that 
complainants are not disadvantaged by the use of discretion. This is because the 
surveys focus upon whether the complainant followed up the referral rather than on 
whether the outcome of the referral was ultimately effective from the perspective of 
the complainant. This gap requires further exploration, especially in light of evidence 
that respondents who were referred back to agencies by a state ombudsman had not 
received a decision they considered to be fair and reasonable. 61 
With reference to this gap as to whether complainants receive satisfactory outcomes 
through being referred back, the Office has used its powers of systemic investigation to 
monitor whether this use of discretion or lreferral back! to agencies works in practice 
for the individual complainant. For example, in the Executive Summary of the 
systemic investigation titled 'Review of the Child Support Agency's CCSA') Complaint 






My office has adopted a policy of !decline and refer! for agencies that have a viable mternal 
complaints service, on the basis that it is desirable for agencies to deal with complaints about 
their actions anq. service, in the first instance.62 
Ron McLeod concluded in the same report that: 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2003-04) 23. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (200S-D9) 17. 
Similar research carried out by the Queensland Ombudsman in 2004 notes a failure of 33.4 
per cent of complainants to pursue their complaint: Queensland Ombudsman, Annual 
Report (2004-05) 14. One of the principal findings was that '46.8% of complainants did not 
follow our advice to contact the agencyl see David Bevan, 'Survey of complainants referred 
to agencies I (presentation to 22nd APOR Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 2004). 
David Bevan, ISurvey of complainants referred to agencies' (Presentation to 22nd APOR 
Conterence, Wellington, New Zealand, 2004) 2. 
Ron McLeod, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Review of the Child Support Agency's Complaint 
Service (2001) 1. 
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In a clear majority of cases, the Complaints Service effectively and efficiently resolved the 
complaints originally brought to my office. It is therefore reasonable for my office (in the 
absence of any special factors) to continue to decline to investigate complaints where the 
complainant has not been to the Complaints Service and to refer them there instead, with 
an invitation to return to my office if the Complaints Service is unable to resolve the 
problem63 
Despite such review there remains ongoing need for systematic empirical mapping 
of the outcome for individuals who are referred away. This is due to the fact that each 
method adopted by the Office - Client Surveys or monitoring through systemic 
investigation - has limitations. For example the above systemic investigation of the 
CSA Complaint Service fails to assess what proportion of complainants who are 
referred back to the Complaints Service follow that advice. In short, further empirical 
work must be undertaken to determine whether complainants referred away from the 
Office do follow that advice and whether they then gain a satisfactory outcome. 
Given the dramatic increase in referrals away from the Office of complainants who 
are in jurisdiction since the mid 1990s the need for such analysis is critical. This call is 
reinforced through a background of underwhelming history of independent empirical 
review undertaken with respect to the operation of the Office. The only comprehensive 
empirical study by external investigators to determine whether the Office is efficient 
and effective in terms of its role and function took place in 1991, following the first 15 
years of operation of the Office, and was conducted by the Senate Standing Committee 
on Finance and Public Administration (,Review'). The Review was conducted from a 
public administration rather than a legal standpoint, reviewing the 'Ombudsman's 
jurisdiction, performance, resources and legislation primarily as they affect the overall 
system of public administration not the legal system'. 64 Indeed, most Australian 
commentary takes the approach of balancing positive observations against negative 
comments to arrive at conclusions as to the success of the Office. A prominent example 
is the 1970s reports responsible for the inception of the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
where, in endorsing the recommendation for the creation of a Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, the Bland Committee noted that there is a 'price for having an 
Ombudsman' and nonetheless concluded that the benefits outweighed the 
disadvantages65 The Committee made a number of intuitive evaluations, citing the 
benefits as the correction of error and the limprovement that occurs in administrative 
procedure and the care with which officials handle their relations with the public. '66 
The negatives were the fact that not all grievances could be solved by the Ombudsman; 
that decision-making might be delayed or too much time taken to avoid error if a 
government authority knew it would later be reviewed by the Ombudsman; the fact 





Ibid 2. On a side note, the issue as to whether the outcomes and impact of own motion 
investigations are evaluated sufficiently by the Office also requires empirical attention. 
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 23, 64. Apart 
from this review, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was the subject of a working party 
report which was implemented in part by the Ombudsman Amendment Act 1983 (Cth): 
Administrative Review Council, Jurisdiction of Ombudsman: Working Party Report to Council 
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Commonwealth, Interim Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, above n 2, [65]. 
Ibid [64]. 
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discretion. All of these effects might occur without at the same time lessening the load 
of Members of Parliament in dealing with grievances. 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman is in good company, indeed international 
commentary on the government or classical ombudsmen overwhelmingly supports the 
success of the institution. 67 Yet a central feature of this analysis is the absence of an 
accepted or universal methodology used to support such a conclusion68 The absence 
of accepted empirical measures opens the debate to the use of statistical data to 
evaluate whether the Office has failed the individual citizen. Of course such evaluation 
is open to criticism, as the Office itself observes: 
Statistics, of course, tell only part of a story. It is the way they are interpreted that conveys 
the real message ... While it is difficult to be definitive, the discussion of these possibilities 
will be better infonned if there is contextual data available on how people perceive the 
office.69 
Despite the lack of a universally accepted evaluative approach, empirical 
investigation must be taken up by academics and other independent external 
investigators.70 Without such independent analysis the Office, in using such high rates 
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Ombudsman Systems' in Roy Gregory and Philip Giddings (eds), Righting Wrongs: The 
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!Towards an Understanding of a Constitutional Misfit: Four Snapshots of the Ombudsman 
Enigma! in Chris Finn (ed), Sunrise or Sunset? Administrative Law in the New Millennium 
(2000) 188, 188 who uses the phrase the 'ombudsman enigma' in arguing that the 'office for 
too long has been neglected by Parliament, academics, lawyers and others!; Dennis Pearce, 
!The Jurisdiction of Australian Government Ombudsmen! in Matthew Groves (ed), Law and 
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whom it was established to assist, as even the perception that the Ombudsman is 
turning away a high number of complainants may undermine the authenticity of 
claims made as to contributions made to democratic accountability. 
Why is there an increasing rate in the use of discretion? 
While not evidenced by the data, the suggestion made in this article is that the 
changing discretion rate is the result of a decade long conscious strategy of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman. There are at least two interrelated reasons for this 
strategy: firstly, limited resources and external pressures being brought to bear upon 
the Office; and secondly, the internal strategic choice of the most recent three 
Ombudsman to pursue a more proactive role in improving the quality of public 
administration more generally. 
With respect to the first reason, external resource allocation by government will 
have a critical impact upon the operations of the Office. At the 25th anniversary of the 
Administrative Review Council in 2001 it was noted: 
In recent years government has not encouraged continued expansion of the concept of 
review of government decisions. Financial and other limits have been placed upon review 
bodies with the result that the effectiveness of the system to provide adequate means for 
review of government decisions has been markedly diminished. By way of diverse examples, 
the Ombudsman now exercises the discretion not to undertake investigations in relation to 
70% of the complaints received by the Office. In 1995-96 that figure was 45%. In 1991-92 it 
was 33%.71 
Just four years earlier, in 1997, the Office reported that 
the funding of the office had been reduced by 20% over 2 years which linked to the 
closing of the office in Tasmania and its replacement by a toll free number to Melbourne, 
the loss of two community liaison officers, one for indigenous people and one for non-
English speaking people and an increase in the use of the Ombudsman1s discretion ie: 
complaints that are received but declined any investigation. The discretion rate had gone 
up over the last year from 40% to 50%, or 4000 cases not being dealt with. 72 
Implicit in the above quotes is the notion that the Office is a 'one stop shop'. This 
means that if the resource allocation to the Office is reduced the internal allocation and 
decision making must find budget cuts from somewhere and realistically this will be 
done by the Office 'managing' its reactive complaint-driven role. Of course the 
Ombudsman is not unique in this respect. The Australian Law Reform Commission 
has noted the necessity for managing reactive complaint-handling as 'triage' across the 
entirety of the federal system, involving the initial and prompt sefaration of cases 
according to the degree of urgency and specialist attention required.7 
External pressure may also playa role in the increasing rate of discretion. In the 
early 1990s, coinciding with the rise in the use of discretion, several external events 
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Multicultural Australia Project recommended 'the Ombudsman ... take a leading and 
coordinating role in the promotion of administrative review,74 and secondly, the 1991 
Review by the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration 
which investigated the effectiveness of the operation of the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman stated that while the 'principal role of the Office should remain the 
investigation and resolution of complaints by individuals', the Office should improve 
administration by providing feedback to departments on complaints trends, by 
reviewing its complaint systems and by establishing a specialist investigation unit 
within the Office to investigate major complaints75 
These external factors either drive and/or complement internal strategy. The 
second reason for the high rates of discretion may be linked to the choice of the Office 
to increase emphasis upon the development of the roles of systemic improvement and 
audit. The complaint-handling role of the Office is reactive. Amongst ombudsmen the 
practice of controlling numbers of individual complaints handled through discretion is 
neither new nor surprising. The Office is not alone in making such choices. For 
example, '[w]hen reviewing the history of the Danish Ombudsman institution, one 
finds deliberate and consistent efforts to control the number of incoming cases and at 
the same time make it possible to work at the general level.' 76 As the Office is a one 
stop shop an increasing discretion rate allows internal redistribution of resources and 
the development of differing emphasis in relation to its operations. 
This assertion is supported - though not proven - through analysis of the 
individual Ombudsman who utilise increased discretion rates. For example, Table 1 
shows Philippa Smith, the Ombudsman between 1993 and 1998, applying discretion 
rates of 46-63 per cent. The period where she is the incumbent Ombudsman marks the 
start of the trend to escalate the use of discretion. From the beginning of her term she 
prioritised non-complaint-handling roles - in particular the system-fixing role. 
Philippa Smith argued that it was this capacity to review practices, legislative 
proviSions, and procedures which was unique in the administrative review arena and 
therefore set the Ombudsman apart from other institutions of administrative review. 
She observed that a ~riority is the identification and correction of the underlying 
causes of complaints' 7 and that 'this preventive role is a key part of the modern 
Ombudsman's role'.78 
As Table 3 shows this continued use of discretion remains high under her 
successors. Between the years of 1999 to 2005, the discretion rate is at 70 per cent and 
above. It confirms that the average discretion rate for these six years is 76 per cent 
meaning that of the 109 462 complainants that came to the Office only 26 533 had their 
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Table 3: 
Individual complaints finalised Ombudsman Act 1976 (Oh) from 1999-2005 
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2004-2005 JM 16192 11755 73% 
2003-2004 JM 16297 11881 73% 
2002-2003 RM 18814 13170 70% 
2001-2002 RM 18036 14242 79% 
2000-2001 RM 20967 16657 79% 
1999-2000 RM 19156 15224 79% 
Totals 109462 82929 76% 
If this assertion is true - that increased discretion to turn away individual 
complainants matches an increased focus upon the quality of public administration -
then the use of discretion at the rates identified in Table 3 will continue. Ibis is the case 
as the strategy of the Office remains one of invigorating attention into the alternate 
non-individual complaint-handling own motion and audit roles. In the 2007-08 Annual 
Report Professor McMillan, the current Ombudsman, confirmed that: 
The office plans to intensify its own motion and auditing role in the coming years. 
Individual complaint-handling will always remain the core business of the office, but 
needs to be supplemented by other techniques for identifying problems and improving 
government. This is a necessary response to the growing size and complexity of 
government and the frequent contact that people have with government across all 
aspects of their lives.79 
Indeed the Office now states in its Annual Reports that it has three roles: individual 
complaint-handling (its core focus); own motion; and audit. 
ONE FOR ALL: INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT-HANDLER AND QUALITY-
CONTROLLER 
While the Commonwealth Ombudsman was primarily introduced to provide a free 
and quick mechanism to the individual citizen to ensure that administration by 
government is transparent, efficient and in accordance with law, there is nothing 
inherently untoward about the evolving systemic and audit roles. Indeed, when 
reviewing the development of the Commonwealth Ombudsman there is recurring 
79 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2007-08) viii. 
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recognition of the dual roles80 of individual complaint handler and system improver 
with the systemic improvement role being consistently acknowledged as a secondary 
function of the institution. 
Thus, there is no impediment to the Commonwealth Ombudsman diversifying its 
roles. Indeed, apart from its operational legislation, 81 the word 'Ombudsman' itself,82 
while being a powerful brand or trade name, contains no prescription as to usage. This 
is most simply captured by the plethora of descriptors of what an Ombudsman does: 
combining 'the judicial functions of judge or magistrate and the administrative 
functions of an inquisitor';83 a Twatchdog! or 'protector l;84 'a person who redresses the 
power imbalance1;85 and a Iman or woman who combines the functions of a mediator, 
reformer, and fighter'.86 The movement by the Commonwealth Ombudsman towards 
increasing its focus upon systemic improvement and enhancing its audit role reflects 
the movement of other ombudsmen across Australia where many of the public law 
ombudsmen offices have diversified in terms of their roles and functions87 
Oearly, while the ability of an individual to make a complaint against government 
and to be heard and have a decision reviewed, remains one of the major purposes of 
the institution of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, it is only one purpose. There was 
acknowledgment in the interim report of the Bland Committee that not every 
discretionary power affects the citizen nor the relationships between the government 
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2010 Changing Emphasis of the Commonwealth Ombudsman 163 
many of the powers have no significance in the sense that they can personally affect the 
citizen. Those that do personally effect the citizen do not all have the same si~ficance ... 
Yet that is not to say that there should be no review at all in any of these cases. 8 
The other purpose of the Office therefore exists apart from the individual 
complainant. Ombudsmen are now expected to not only provide individual redress, 
but also to produce some form of 'policy impact': administrative policy changes which 
have consequences into the future and beyond the particular decision complained 
against. Own motion investigations are a tool used by ombudsmen to promote quality 
control which aims 'to inculcate standards of lawfulness, fairness, rationality and 
accountability across public administration for the betterment of all those who deal 
with government' 89 It is therefore appropriate that the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
promote an aim of administrative law which is to improve the overall quality of public 
administration - to provide good managerial normative guidance and thus ensure 
managerial accountability of the bureaucracy and government agencies to the public. 
In this sense the Commonwealth Ombudsman should rectify administrative defects as 
a managerial quality improvement tool. 
Despite the legitimacy of this objective, Professor Dennis Pearce warns that '[t]here 
is a danger in Australia that the original purpose for the establishment of the office is 
being lost' 90 The danger Professor Pearce alludes to may include resources 
increaSingly being diverted from the core functions of ombudsman. The issue raised is 
not one of whether the movement to embrace auditing or systemic improvement 
should or may occur. Rather, the danger lies in the degree to which such a shift or an 
ever expanding jurisdiction will involve the Commonwealth Ombudsman in moving 
away from its core function of individual complaint handling. 
While it is not suggested that the Commonwealth Ombudsman be forever shackled 
to its historical aims and origins, it is argned that the individual complaint-handling 
function of ombudsmen not be subverted or lost as the founders' intentions as to the 
'new administrative law' do have continuing relevance. 91 Ombudsmen were created to 
deal with the 'persistent bureaucratic maladiesT92 of insensitivity, poor service, 
arrogance, inflexibility, haste and rudeness by a government department. The 
normative origins of the ombudsman institution is perhaps best captured in the 
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recent years to enlarge the scope of rights to initiate administrative review. This was 
certainly the intention of those who planned the creation of the AAT.' See also Public Seroice 
Board ofNSW v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656,673 (Wilson J): 'Furthermore, some significance 
must attach to the time when these statutes were enacted, coming at the end of a decade of 
extraordinary executive and legislative activity in Australia directed to the improvement of 
efficiency and procedural fairness in public administration: see, e.g, the 1971 Report of the 
Commonwealth Administrative Review Corrunittee (the Kerr Committee).' 
Roger Cramton, 'A Federal Ombudsman' (1972) 1 Duke Law Journal 1, 2. 
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Friedman [1984] 14 DLR 129. In this decision the Court approved of the following 
statement of H R Wade in Administrative Law, 5th ed, who, in explaining the special role 
the Ombudsmen have come to fill, wrote: 
But there is a large residue of grievances which fit into none of the regular legal moulds 
but are nODe the less real. A humane system of government must provide some way of 
assuaging thernf both for the sake of justice and because accumulating discontent is a 
serious clog on administrative efficiency in a democratic country ... What every form of 
government needs is some regular and smooth-running mechanism for feeding back the 
reactions of its disgruntled customers, after impartial assessment, and for correcting 
whatever may have gone wrong. 93 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman must not travel so far on its current trajectory of 
improving the quality of public administration that it is in danger of losing this 
original purpose. 
Resolution of this issue is fundamental to the effective operation of the 
Ombudsman and therefore to ensuring democratic accountability. The Kerr 
Committee, in considering the introduction of the 'new administrative law' package in 
the 1970s commented upon the tension between administrative review and 
administrative efficiency: 'although administrative efficiency is a dominant objective of 
the administrative process, nevertheless the achievement of that objective should be 
consistent with the attainment of justice to the individual.' 94 The implicit warning of 
the Kerr Committee is to move too far towards administrative efficiency may be at the 
expense of the individual meaning that 'the chief beneficiary of this Office [will be] the 
Executive branch of Goverrunent ... '.95 
The danger need not be one where the Office actually loses, or has lost sight of its 
commitment to the individual citizen. Indeed such a conclusion would ignore the 
current rhetoric of the Office which is to reinforce the importance of the individual 
complaint-handling role. As noted by Professor John McMillan '[t]he core activity of 
the office remains the handling of complaints and enquiries from members of the 
public about government administrative action.'96 Instead the danger may be one of 
shifts in perception - indeed the perception that the individual citizen holds of justice 
and accessibility is just as critical as the actuality of the delivery of services. The 
broader issue, then, is whether the Office will, through an increased use of c1iscretion, 







Inevitably the pressures on any Ombudsman towards conformity and absorption in the 
governmental machinery are heavy and continuous. To resist them without at the same time 
forfeiting the confidence of either the public or the adrrrinistration calls not only for a certain 
agility of approach but also an awareness of the changing nature of society and the changing 
base of government within society.97 
See British Development Corporation v Friedman [1984]14 DLR 129,139 (Dickson J). 
Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [12]. 
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 23, 386-7. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2006-07) 2. 
George Laking, 'Address at the Official Openmg' (Speech delivered at the Sixth Conference 
of Australasian and Pacific Ombudsman 1982) in Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual 
Report (1982-83) 145 (Appendix C). 
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The obvious danger of increasing rates of discretion is the perception that 
government and the public service, rather than the individual citizen, are the greatest 
beneficiaries of the Office's investigations. The contest for the Office may no longer be 
one of how to react to demanded rights of the individual citizen against agencies but 
rather one of ensuring that it maintains the perception of its neutrality and therefore 
public confidence as the Office increasingly takes up the more interesting pursuit of 
issues of quality control in government policy. The battle for the Office may therefore 
be how to best manage an increasingly close relationship with government. 
The implication is, from the perspective of the citizen, that while there is the benefit 
of an improved normative culture of administrative decision-making that an increased 
quality focus will bring, the drawback is the reduction in the numbers of individual 
complaints dealt with by the Ombudsman (assuming a continued limit on provision of 
external resources). In this sense the largest hurdle for the Office will be maintaining 
positive public perception of its relationship to government. While the historical focus 
of the Office is upon individual complaints it is also clear that the role of system-fixer is 
accepted as a justified and increasingly important one. The Office must, however, 
convince the wider public that it will change the system and that it will do so for the 
improvement of public administration generally rather than just being a public 
relations exercise for the benefit of government. 
There are also practical considerations behind this suggestion. The first is that, in 
terms of acting effectively as a quality control agent, it is important that the Office 
maintain a duality of roles or a mixed approach. That is, administrative deficiencies 
should be identified by both a top-down or managerial approach and a bottom-up or 
individual complainant approach. This is to avoid the selection of quality control 
issues becoming completely either agency driven or managerial. The second is that, in 
the wider administrative law system, it is critical that the role of the Office as an 
alternative mechanism for the resolution of grievances be preserved where other 
avenues of review are not available or inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1970s administrative law reforms manifested a political desire to make public 
officials accountable for their actions and to provide individuals with effective and 
accessible remedies for correcting defective public administration. The traditional 
kernel of Australian administrative law is this centralisation of an individual rights 
based approach to review with the aim of rendering government decision-makers 
accountable to the public. In this context 'individual rights' and 'accountability' are 
broadly understood as being both instruments to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of public governance and as being goals in themselves - indeed both 
concepts have remained largely unquestioned as holy grails of administrative law. 98 
Three decades on and the current approach of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, to 
increasingly control the numbers and types of individual complaints the office 
investigates, highlights the necessity for review of the current application of these 
iconic concepts. Such revision was envisaged as early as 1977 when, in the foreword to 
98 Mark Bovens, lAnalysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual Framework! 
(2007) 13(4) Eurapean Law Joumal447, 454. 
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the Administrative Review Council's First Annual Report, the then Brennan J observed 
in relation to the 'new administrative law' that 
the structures of administrative review will inevitably produce changes in the citizen's 
relationship with govermnent and in the workings of the machinery of government. 
Changes of these kinds will not be effected without the development of tensions, but the 
tensions should produce constructive and critical examination of the new system.99 
In line with Brennan J's prediction, the operational structures of administrative 
review have changed the citizen's relationship with the machinery of government. 
There is now an expectation that individual complainants about government 
administration will be met by good normative complaint handling systems across the 
whole of government. Once agencies are handling complaints effectively the 
importance or value of an individual complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman is 
now more often assessed by its capacity to expose systemic deficiencies and thus result 
in quality improvement. 
Such fundamental change necessitates questioning the ongoing role and value of 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman in ensuring accountability. The explicit trigger for 
such review is the high cliscretion rate applied by the Office to turn away individual 
complainants. An ever present danger for ombudsmen is to be used as a public 
relations tool of government, a place created by government where citizens may go 
with their complaints but when they arrive they find themselves being sent away. As 
the Office pursues the conscious objective of increasing emphasis upon its systemic 
improvement and audit roles the issue becomes one as to whether the Office has, or 
will, move too far along the path of improving the bureaucracy at large and in turn 
minimise the perceived or actual accountability mechanisms which it offers the 
individual citizen. 
The assumption behind this suggestion is that there is a point at which the 
ombudsman institution is transformed so that it departs from its original role and 
function and thus implicitly loses credibility with respect to the protection of the 
interests and rights of an individual citizen. Importantly this is an assumption. The 
claim is not made that the Commonwealth Ombudsman has reached that point. To 
date the Commonwealth Ombudsman has increased its use of discretion to decline to 
deal with an increasing number of individual complainants without fracturing the 
institution. Indeed the institution has grown in relevance and stature over the last 30 
years. lOO July 2007 marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Office of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman which was widely hailed as three decades of success as 






• the high numbers of citizen complaints about government administration 
which the Office has dealt with;102 
Administrative Review CoundIr First Annual Report (1977) Foreword. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2006-07) at 2. 
Dennis Pearce, above n 90, 138 stating '[TJhe ombudsman is now a well established part of 
the Australian government scene ... no government would now act to abolish the office.' 
Professor John McMillan in the Annual Report celebrating three decades of operation 
observes that over its thirty years of operation the Office Ihas dealt with more than 600 000 
complaints' see Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2006--07) 6. 
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• the Senate Standing Committee finding that the Office has made a 'positive 
contribution to Australian public administration';103 
• positive commentary by external observers and ombudsmen;104 and 
• the ongoing expansion of jurisdiction of the Office supported by successive 
federal governments105 
Any evaluation of the Commonwealth Ombudsman must be cognizant that both 
the institution of the Ombudsman and administrative law are 'in perpetual motion' .106 
Perhaps the broader lesson which may then be drawn by observers of Ombudsman, 
administrative law and policy-makers is that the ombudsman institution may evolve 
and diversify its functions without compromising its principles or aims. The central 
import of this article is to highlight the fluidity of the Ombudsman institution in 
developing new and old functions. This enhanced understanding leads to increased 
knowledge and improved outcomes in terms of what ombudsmen may offer society. 
More broadly it reinforces the changing nature of administrative law and highlights 
the need for careful and timely review of its evolution to ensure it continues to achieve 
its purpose of enhancing the individual citizen's democratic right to call the 
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